Should the Membership and Veto Rights in the UNSC Be Reformed to Improve State Compliance with International Law?

Yuxi Jin

doi:10.54254/2753-7048/2025.LD28431

Abstract

The Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) is pivotal in the maintenance of international law but its format—five permanent members (P5) with veto powers—has been accused of detracting from authority and compliance by states. This article investigates whether a change in UNSC membership and veto rights could improve compliance with its resolutions. The literature review synthesizes critiques from scholars like Mukerji, Fassbender, and Hurd, emphasizing the need for structural change amid geopolitical shifts. Using a qualitative multi-case study methodology, it compares and contrasts four case studies - the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War (2022-present), the US-Israel relationship, the 1963-1965 partial reform and the 1979-1992 deadlock on developing country representation. These examples demonstrate how the misuse of veto power protects aggressor and allied states from being held accountable, the anachronistic P5 membership fails to represent the global power configuration, and previous reforms, which whilst symbolic, have not really tackled major inefficiencies. Three hypotheses are tested and supported: (1) veto rights are abused to protect national interests, paralyzing enforcement; (2) permanent membership lacks global representation, eroding credibility; and (3) previous reforms were ineffective in promoting compliance. Proposed changes include adding permanent seats for several democratic states in less well-represented regions (e.g., Africa, Latin America, India), limiting the use of the veto in atrocity-related matters, holding regular reviews, and broadening the involvement of non-members. Although Charter amendments under Article 108 are met with P5 opposition, incremental steps such as the voluntary renunciation of veto and the formation of coalitions of middle powers may help steer progress. Absent reform, the UNSC is in fact in danger of losing even further its authority, culminating in selective adherence and eventually international law fragmentation. This article finds that institutional transformation is necessary for a just and effective world-system.

Keywords: UN Security Council , Reform , Permanent Membership , Veto Right.

Article Information

Received: 17 October 2025

Published: 23 October 2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/2025.LD28431

Article Type: Research Article

Cite this article

Jin,Y. (2025). Should the Membership and Veto Rights in the UNSC Be Reformed to Improve State Compliance with International Law?. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,128,30-40.

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The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

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About this Volume

Volume Title: LNEP Vol.128

Part of Series: Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media

ISSN: 2753-7048 (Print) / 2753-7056 (Online)

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